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The article explores ways in which the Palestinian women’s movement has mobilized around the recent transition
from national liberation to interim self-government. I discuss the gendered mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion
which characterize emergent processes of citizenship and legal reform, and analyse the terms in which women are
currently renegotiating their membership in the process of statebuilding. I conclude by looking at how recent shifts
in political authority have problematized women’s struggles, and discuss how organised women are presently
working through these dilemmas by articulating gender-sensitive positions on citizenship that are distinct from the
nationalist agenda.
1A growing body of literature on Palestinian women has worked to revise conventional
perceptions of the relationship between women and nationalism in the Middle East. This
scholarship has demonstrated the centrality of Palestinian women in sustaining both the
national liberation movement since the turn of the century, and the popular uprising
(Intifada) against Israeli Occupation since 1987. These writings refer to the female
Palestinian nationalist as an active and varied political subject, with prominent images
ranging from honourable virgin, dedicated mother, weeping martyr - to popular leader,
cheap labourer, political prisoner and guerrilla warrior. Scholarship on women in Middle
Eastern nationalist movements has had the dual effect of challenging neo-colonialist and
orientalist perceptions of women as passive “Other”1, but also restricting inquiry into the
complex mechanisms of patriarchal domination within the movements themselves. In the
Palestinian context, national liberation made women’s political mobilization indispensable,
but it also created and exacerbated profound contradictions in gender relations. The
Intifada provided public space for the political mobilization of women in support for the
national struggle, but also circumscribed women’s struggle for social liberation to areas
considered appropriate to traditional “feminine” concerns (for example, childbearing,
childrearing and social services). As a result, nationalism was both inclusionary and
exclusionary, providing Palestinian women with an essential, yet problematic, framework
through which to negotiate equal terms of inclusion in the current process of statebuilding.
Since the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Palestinian nationalism has been
mobilized largely at the informal and grass-roots level. However, with the establishment of
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)2 since 1993, prospects for statehood have been
set in motion through official and diplomatic channels. This paper begins with the
assumption that legal reform is an important arena of political struggle that potentially
complements other spheres in societies struggling against colonial or neocolonial rule. With
limited authority, the PNA has, to a significant degree, usurped the momentum of popular
struggle through political and judicial activity. To what extent has the focus of popular
struggle shifted as a result and what are its implications? The institutional changes
accompanying state building, for example, the centralization of political authority in
diplomatic negotiations and national institutions such as the Legislative Council, the
Palestinian police force, and the civil service, have affected the boundaries of gender
activism. The strengths and weaknesses of these institutions play an important role in
empowering or disempowering social forces through their participation in political conflict
2Jacoby — Issues of Gender and Palestinian Citizenship
(both inside and outside the PNA). They influence social practice through the legislation
and administration of public policy, thus impacting both the scope and space available for
women’s activism in Palestinian society. As such, citizenship, statehood and the law are
considered central subjects for inquiry in my work on Palestinian women.
Looking at the transition phase to Palestinian “self-rule” from a gender-sensitive
perspective, I argue that the shift in power away from the popular arena where women
were prominent leaders has problematized gender activism. The focus of power,
particularly as envisioned in the Oslo Accords, has been redirected through more subtle,
yet centralized and highly exclusionary, struggles on the part of diplomatic representatives
over terms of peace, citizenship and rights legislation. The transition period has
marginalized opposition groups as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O) has sought
to consolidate its hegemony through monopoly over PNA affairs. Competition over political
authority is also reflected in the struggle between the P.L.O leadership in Tunis (“outside
leadership”) and the local political elite (“inside leadership”). In both groupings, the transfer
of authority has been marked by the consolidation in power of the Palestinian elite male,
i.e., the politician/businessman/patriarchal head of wealthy household. Struggles between
“inside” and “outside” leadership therefore, are profoundly gendered and class-based.
These struggles take place within institutions where women are underrepresented. As a
result, public and foreign policy are legislated largely without questioning the gendered
impact on men and women. Seen in this way, women’s struggles for political equality in
statebuilding are seen as an endemic part of the larger struggle for democratization and
social liberation in Palestinian statehood.
This paper explores the ways in which institutional changes accompanying the
transformative period from nationalism to interim self-government impact Palestinian
women and their political struggles. The intention is to distinguish between categories of
“woman” and “nationalist” in discussions about citizenship during the transition to “self-rule”.
The main question I address is, what are the gendered implications of statebuilding and
citizenship in Palestinian society? To answer this question, I rely predominantly upon
issues and debates from material published by grassroots women’s organisations, including
independent study centres and advocacy groups, along with interviews of organised
women. Recent changes have had a differential impact on Palestinian men and women
because of the penetration of long-standing networks of patriarchal power in the
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statebuilding process. They have also had a differential impact on Palestinian women
depending upon their location on the political spectrum, i.e. as independents or as
members of groups which support or oppose the PNA. The construction of citizenship is
informed by experiences and discourses of national liberation, so I will begin by exploring
the concept of gender in Palestinian nationalism, and then proceed to a discussion of
women, statebuilding and citizenship in the Palestinian context.
Gendered Nationalism:
In her discussion of “third world”3 women, Deniz Kandiyoti argues that nationalism has been
the leading idiom through which issues pertaining to women’s position in society have been
articulated.4 Initial space for gender activism in non-western societies often develops
through conflict around national liberation/anti-colonialism. This is the general starting point
for distinguishing “third world” or middle eastern feminisms from the historical conditions
of their western counterparts. As opposed to women who experience colonialism from the
position of the dominant power, women in national liberation movements tend to become
politically active through the struggle of colonized men to overcome their subjection and
regain their virility. This framework of inclusion in the struggles of dominated men can be
problematic for women struggling against indigenous forms of gender oppression.
Brackette Williams presents this problematic for nationalist women of having to “...struggle
against sexual domination without appearing to undermine the quest for masculine
redemption”5. The liberation of these women is formulated as a sort of “double movement”:
the first is directed against colonial patriarchy and so is tolerated and even revered, but
because the second movement is directed against indigenous patriarchy, it is often seen
as detrimental to national unity. What then are the implications of a gender-activism that
develops through militarized conflict against colonialism? What are the opportunities and
limitations of articulating feminism through war? What is the nature of an indigenous
Palestinian feminism?6 I will address these issues by exploring the concept of nationalism
and accompanying constructions of citizenship in the Palestinian context. 
According to Benedict Anderson’s construct of an “imagined community”, nations strive to
be both inherently limited and sovereign.7 Nations, he claims, are repositories of a selective
incorporation of cultural artifacts, traditions and rituals from a sacred past based on
manipulating processes of memory and invention in political group formation. In this light,
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nations are seen to develop in a constant state of historical flux, and so their boundaries
require continuous engineering to be molded and remolded, produced and reproduced
according to the dictates of political interest.8 The act of remembering the past is often
reinforced by forgetting those aspects which are unpalatable for national unity, for example,
the gendered processes which serve to build, over long spans of time, constructions of
“masculinity” and “femininity” upon which the notion of nationalism is based. Therefore, the
process of nation-building is arbitrary and yet it corresponds to concrete power relations.
The ultimate purpose of nationalism is to establish a nation-state, i.e. a permanent and
compulsory organisation which attempts to govern through control over the means of
coercion and ideological reproduction in a given territory.9 This process seeks to
institutionalize, transform and channel a selective array of authentic symbols and shared
histories into a stable foundation for legitimate authority. As such, the boundaries of a state
are expected to become predictable and determinate. Indeed, the ability of a state to
govern depends upon creating a fixed membership based on spaces of “inside” and
“outside”, upon which are established routinized patterns of policy, ideology and identity.
As a product of political conflict, therefore, a state is a mechanism of inclusion and
exclusion, whose particular form is reinforced and justified ideologically by the underlying
configuration of power in a given society. As we will see, patriarchal power is sought as one
of the most stable, yet problematic, sources of political authority, and one of the most
exclusive forms of political identity.
Nationalism is, in general, a profoundly gendered process formulated around normative and
exclusive constructs of “male” and “female” political participation. Nira Yuval-Davis and
Floya Anthias articulate the ideological terms in which women have participated in
nationalist movements. Firstly, they claim, women tend to be transformed into symbolic
markers of the boundaries of an ethnic-national group by virtue of their biological role as
virgin/wife/mother in reproducing and educating future generations of the group.10 This
primary role, assumed to correspond with nature and to complement men’s role as
father/fighter/economic provider, is accompanied by women’s participation themselves in
national, political and military struggles. The role of the “woman warrior” is a central position
in times of conflict, yet it is often excused as a temporary “national emergency” rather than
emulated as a model for transformative politics.
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Valentine Moghadam explores women’s roles in reflection on Benedict Anderson’s work
on nationalism. According to Moghadam, Anderson explains the assignment of women to
the role of bearers of cultural values, carriers of traditions, and symbols of the community,
by defining nationalism as akin to kinship and religion. As Moghadam argues, 
If the nation is an extended family writ large, then women’s role is to carry out
the tasks of nurturance and reproduction. If the nation is defined as a
religious entity, then the appropriate models of womanhood are to be found
in scripture.11
Both models of womanhood are highly problematic. Despite women’s actual and varied
practice, their role is imagined through symbols of nationalist discourse in accordance with
the perceived logic of social custom, tradition, and religious belief. The expectation that
women will conform to their roles is considered to be a crucial ingredient for the
development and unity of the nation, and because nationalism is an essentially open
concept, it is often manipulated in gendered ways and used as justification for control over
the actual lives of women. 
Prior to the Intifada beginning December 1987, it was generally assumed that women’s
liberation was either to be subordinated to nationalism, subsumed within nationalism, or
postponed until after the revolution. In times of war, gender activism was seen as
superfluous in relation to the more immediate exigencies of occupation and survival. The
bulk of the literature on Palestinian women in the Intifada seeks not to oppose this claim,
but rather to challenge traditional images of women as supportive, passive or secondary
by demonstrating how the national liberation struggle was dependent upon women’s
contributions outside the public arena in areas of familial and communal work. For example,
Yvonne Haddad documents the activities of urban and upper-class Palestinian nationalist
women in the period of the British Mandate (1918-1948) in areas of female education,
charitable work, literacy campaigns and training in sewing and embroidery.12 These social
service and welfare activities reflected women’s traditional work but were enacted on the
basis of a larger nationalist and anti-colonialist agenda.13 This period of struggle was one
in which the female Palestinian nationalist endeavored to “liberate the entire community
from oppression, poverty, and alienation which meant not a license to live independently,
but rather the ability to live up to communal expectations”.14 
During the Intifada, the four women’s committees established in the mid-1970s and
affiliated to different segments of the P.L.O15, engaged in women-run production
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cooperatives of foodstuffs, clothing, embroidery and other items for sale on the local
market, and participated in running food collection and storage facilities. Women took up
popular leadership positions in neighborhood committees, and participated with the shabab
(Palestinian youth) in guard units and direct confrontations (stone throwing and tire burning)
with the Israeli military.16 This activity not only helped the community to overcome food
shortages and boycott the influx of Israeli products, but also worked to alleviate the
economic dependence of women on the family, and offset the burdens of an increasing
number of female-headed households as a result of male death, imprisonment or
deportation. In reflection on these altered gender roles during the Intifada, current debate
in the Palestinian women’s movement revolves around the potential compatibility of
nationalism with women’s rights. It is recognized that national liberation was articulated as
a predominantly militarized and masculine act of political struggle. In response, women are
attempting to articulate their interests in citizenship as distinct from conflated agendas of
Palestinian men and national liberation. 
Writing on the gendered discourses of Palestinian nationalism, Joseph Massad articulates
the struggle as “a masculinizing act enabling the concrete pairing of nationalist agency and
masculinity”. This act, he argues, is reinforced through gendered narratives constructed in
the founding texts of the national liberation movement.17 In communiqués of the Unified
National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), for example, Massad presents analogies of
women as “the soil upon which a man is to redeem his glory, manhood and honour”.18 The
territory of Palestine is articulated in these documents as the object of a man’s
heterosexual love, whose earth demands fertilization and whose liberation is seen as the
ultimate birth of the Intifada’s pregnancy.19 In communiqué no. 29 of the UNLU, Massad
finds the Palestinian woman saluted in her biological role as, 
the mother of the martyr and her celebratory ululations, for she has ululated
twice, the day her son went to fight and was martyred, and the day the state
was declared.20
 As well, the Declaration of Independence conjures a static image of women in their
courageous role as “the guardian of our survival and our lives, the guardian of our perennial
flame”.21 With reference to Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms, Sheila Hanna Katz
describes the discursive act of “feminizing the land” as a means of creating symbols of
women as the passive object of men’s sacrifice, thus depriving women of their agency as
historical subjects in charge of their own destiny.22 Writing on Palestinian and Israeli
women, Simona Sharoni discusses the terms of inclusion of women in nationalist
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discourse. National liberation, she argues, is discursively organised around the potency and
unity of the nation, and perceptions of national independence are based on the privileging
of territorial sovereignty over alternative claims to political authority.23 The coupling of
territorial acquisition with national identity has tended to perpetuate dichotomized images
of “protector” and “protected” within Palestinian society, whereby men protect women by
seeking control over the land. Territorial acquisition however, is often used to justify control
over women’s bodies.24
The sexual division of labour in Palestinian nationalism, built around notions of
complementarity, protection and respect between men and women, is seen to protect the
nation from perceived external threat.25 Men and the nation are supported by the female
contribution through her prescribed biological and traditional roles in sustaining
reproduction of the community. The centrality of a communal identity, as dependent upon
the ways in which women act and comport themselves, has tended to place indigenous
struggles for sexual liberation outside the nationalist framework. Perceived in this way,
feminism is transformed into a western social norm. Feminist struggles are stereotyped as
threats to the unity of the Palestinian nation due to their perceived privileging of individuality
and equality over the community, and their focus on competition between the sexes.26 This
privileging of community over individual has tended to reproduce internal patterns of
patriarchal domination of the male over the female in nationalist movements. Eric
Hobsbawm suggests that nationalism is about representing a common interest against
particular interests, the common good against privilege.27 Where a common good does not
exist therefore, nation building creates one by masking the internal realities of power, and
forgetting those hierarchies responsible for oppression. Gender oppression is, of course,
a predominant hierarchy naturalized by nationalism.
This construct of women’s maintenance by men affirms the normative boundaries between
public and private spheres, a central division highlighted by feminist theory. Women tend
to be referred to only in their biological capacities in connection with the household and
their interests are constructed as sectional. Men, on the other hand, tend to be separated
from their role in reproduction and their interests are universalized as a form of abstract
citizenship in public policy and political conflict.28 In their public roles, men are supposed
to “protect” a distinct private sphere in which women are to be “maintained”. Men’s act of
making war and power politics is discursively separated from the feminine role of mothering
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and providing social and personal support. Therefore, the “political” is defined by
nationalizing masculinity29 and by both relying upon, but devaluing, activities with which
women are traditionally engaged. Spike Peterson’s suggestion that patriarchal thought and
practice is traditionally founded upon fundamental dichotomies which constitute, and then
privilege, the “masculine” over the “feminine” is instructive.30 Peterson explains this notion
of a “gender hierarchy” or “colonizing dualism” as foundational in the metaphysical
development of western philosophy, whereby the masculine is identified with objectivity,
reason, freedom, and control, against feminine subjectivity, feeling, necessity, contingency
and disorder.31 Rather than escape these foundational themes of colonial and western
civilization, Palestinian nationalism embraces patriarchal norms and transforms them into
a rationale for struggle against “western” domination. Joseph Massad claims,
Although anti-colonialist nationalist agency defines itself in opposition to
European nationalism, it does not escape implication in that same narrative.32
Nationalism, Islam and women:
A gendered aspect of national liberation unique to the Middle East is located in the
intersections of religion, conflict and political authority. Current influences of religion on
politics in the region have been formed, in part, by the rise of politically motivated Islamic
movements. Since the late 1960s, Arab nationalism has been increasingly constructed on
the basis of religious symbols.33 The rise of political Islam has been oriented towards the
normative goal of harnessing national institutions in order to recreate the perceived
indivisible dominion of God through a fusion of religion and statehood.34 According to
Islamic movements, the transformation of secular society depends on their struggle to
establish an Islamic state run according to the precepts of the Sharia (Islamic canon law)
and revival of the caliphate35. The resolution of social conflict is based on an attempt to
make a historical connection with a glorified image of life in 7th Century Arabia. Islamists
claim they are “returning to the sources of Islam to regain a purified vision, long lost in the
mire of wordly governments”.36 This social transformation is profoundly gendered as it
tends to depend upon molding the ways in which women “act, dress, and comport
themselves” in order to conform to the perceived gender harmony of the united umma
(nation) led by the Prophet Mohammed.37 The Islamist model of governance is generally
informed by an orthodox and literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna38, both highly
patriarchal texts, which are to be transformed into practical guidelines for human conduct
and legitimate political authority. Therefore, the relationship between secular and Islamic
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politics holds crucial implications for gender relations and the boundaries of struggle
against patriarchal domination.
In the context of statebuilding in the Middle East, Islamist influence over political authority
is contingent upon the access and control by Islamist groups over the process of legislation.
Their degree of influence reflects either a conflictual or cooperative engagement with
secular leadership. I would argue that despite power struggles and conflict between secular
nationalists and Islamists over religious freedom and cultural authenticity, they tend to
converge over certain issues pertaining to women. Valentine Moghadam explains this
phenomenon in the Middle East as an effort by Arab states to quell social division and
prevent harbouring of internal unrest. She argues, 
many secular Arab states have sought to accommodate Islamists and retain
their own political power by acquiescing to Islamist demands and passing
legislation unfavourable to women.39 
Secular nationalist organisations have often used their alliances with Islamist movements
for example, to prevent the rise of socialist and communist groups. Both secular states and
Islamic movements have tended to favour continued unity of the patriarchal family for
purposes of social control, thus agreeing upon the relegation of women to the private
sphere and by extension, problematizing women’s position in statebuilding. The “enduring
alliance”40 between secular nationalism and Islamism is particularly significant in limiting
women’s progressivist struggles when religiously sanctioned inequalities become legislated
into state law. This is seen particularly in the area of personal status law based on the
Sharia which tends to provide women with security, but only in terms of a disciplined
maintenance and protection by men, as opposed to equality, freedom and control over
decision-making. The trade-off between “special treatment” of women in Islam as opposed
to their equal status as citizens is an important issue to consider when studying the choices
made by women in Middle Eastern state building processes.
With the moral vacuum engendered by the experience of war and occupation, and due to
the weakness of secular leadership, political Islam became an increasingly popular form
of struggle in the Palestinian context.41 As a result, discussions about Palestinian
statelessness have tended to revolve around conflicts between secular and religious
groups over the authority to interpret Islamic jurisprudence and holy scripture.42 The
increased salience of Islam as a backlash contender for political power in the Palestinian
nationalist movement accompanied the growing public presence of women in the Intifada,
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and reflected growing contradictions in gender relations necessitated by popular struggle.
The two main Islamist groups in the Palestinian autonomy areas are the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB)43 (represented in part by its front organisation, Hamas), and the Islamic
Jihad.44 The Intifada marked a crucial turning point in political Islam as both the MB and the
Islamic Jihad converged on issues of nationalism and became important actors in the
national liberation movement. This was witnessed in particular by the evolution of the
Muslim Brotherhood towards a more militant character and its usurpation of the popular
momentum of the uprising. Its role in national struggle was increasingly condoned by large
segments of Palestinian society with the establishment, by Ahmed Yasin and his
colleagues, of Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya) on December 9, 1987 as a
resistance wing, along with a special militant body, Regiments of ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam
(‘Kata’ib ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam). Hamas constructed an alternative Islamic civil society as
a model for Palestinian nationalism based on a vast network of social services, communal
activities and political struggle.
The evolution of Islamism in the Intifada however, was an increasingly violent form of
activism directed against both external and internal enemies. In a sense, political Islam can
be explained as a form of “militarized religion” which was inherently gendered and often
directed violently against secular Palestinian women. For this reason, it is important to look
at the relationship between militarization in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and militarization
as a form of internal repression, both of which can be religiously sanctioned. The Hijab
(headcovering) campaign is an instructive example of this trend. Partly in reaction to the
bankruptcy of secular nationalism, and partly a response to the relaxing of gender codes
during the Intifada, this campaign involved an effort by certain groups within the Islamic
movement to impose the Hijab by force on all Palestinian women. Najah Manasra
describes the role of Islam as a means to resolve the contradictions concerning the status
of women in Palestinian nationalism by sending them back to the traditional “feminine” roles
of wife and mother.45 Due to the existential nature of debates around Islam, the refusal on
the part of secular and other women to wear the Hijab was interpreted by the Islamic
groups, not only as a protest against their political leadership, but also as a form of religious
heresy, legitimizing a punishment of violent retribution. As such, the imposition of the Hijab
and other religiously-sanctioned modes of behaviour on women during the Intifada
constituted violence and intimidation. It removed the voluntary choice of women to self-
identify religiously and served as a definite means of political coercion, denial, and gender-
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repression.46 Therefore, it is important to distinguish between violent practices of some
politically motivated Islamic movements from the teachings of Islam in general as a form
of spiritual inspiration and source of humanitarian values.47
Islam and nationalism have tended to stand in a close, albeit uneasy, relationship. Islamic
feminists have reiterated restrictions on women’s freedom of dress and movement as an
expression of authentic nationalism, blurring the distinctions between Islam as a source of
spiritual faith and political Islam as a model of political struggle. Islamic women point to the
liberating qualities of Islam as a protest against the failure of western feminism to carve out
an appropriate model for female liberation. In order to affirm their “authenticity”, Islamists
point to the allegedly exploitative nature of gender-relations in the West where they argue,
western-style feminist struggles have liberated women only to the extent that
they are prepared to become sex objects and market their sexuality as an
advertising tool to benefit patriarchal capitalism.48
Secular Palestinian women are seen to embody this “import” of western society despite
evidence of indigenous forms of secularism and feminism.49 In contrast, the roles of Islamic
men and women are seen to be complementary and harmonious, parallel to images
fostered by secular nationalism, and opposed to perceived images of gender relations in
the West as divisive of family values. In this light, donning the Hijab asserts cultural pride
against orientalism and western cultural imperialism, and stands as a symbol of national
struggle, or as a sign of religious piety, and devotion to the family. For Islamists, respect
for women is based on their fulfillment of codes of modesty, chastity, and honour. These
features of the “pious woman” were perceived as symbolic of the continued survival of the
family structure in Palestinian society through turbulent times.50
The second issue relating to Islam and women during the Intifada is subsumed within the
wider configuration of political forces in the national liberation movement. Rema Hammami
points to the ambiguous relationship formed between Islamic groups and Fatah, the
dominant secular, nationalist grouping in the P.L.O (led by Yasir Arafat). She criticizes
Fatah for its poor record on women’s rights and for being the only faction whose affiliated
women’s committee (Women’s Committee for Social Work) concentrates on traditional
charitable work.51 In particular, Hammami accuses Fatah of deliberately forming an alliance
with Islamic groups during the Intifada, and that certain elements of the Unified Leadership
of the Uprising (UNLU) actually supported the Hijab Campaign.52  Ziad Abu-Amr describes
the cooperative elements of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Fatah
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as characteristic of pragmatic interest. For example, despite the PNA’s disciplining of
Hamas as a result of the latter’s attempts to destabilize the peace process through
terrorism, and in so doing undermine the authority of the secular leadership in the eyes of
international negotiating partners, Fatah has cultivated ties with political Islam in order to
gain popular support and offset the power of groups in the PLO such as the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP) and the Communists.53 These shifting alliances between secular nationalism and
Islamic movements shape the prospects for women to struggle for emancipation within the
confines of the national liberation movement. Despite the subsequent decline in power of
Islamic groups since the onset of political negotiations with Israel, the complex relationship
between religion, statebuilding and gender has yet to be worked out in the present period
of legislation.
Palestinian “self-rule” and gender: 
In response to those who have abandoned analysis of the state in the Middle East in favour
of focusing on transnational social movements and civil societies, Suad Joseph has argued,
the nation-state remains of strategic importance to women because of its
centrality as an arena where social groups gain or lose crucial legal and
political protections.54
Although grassroots organising has been an important element of Palestinian politics in the
absence of statehood, interim self-government has undeniably brought about real structural
changes. Therefore, present engagements in legal reform will have a lasting structural
impact on the environment in which social groups will operate in the future. The elements
of compulsion and monopoly in state building - sanctioned by law - are crucial for
determining the gendered terms for women’s inclusion in national processes. When sexual
roles are legislated and encoded into law, they become politically sovereign and so the
state is a central contender in struggles over the meaning of gender in society. State-
sanctioned gender relations are the ultimate institutionalization of the product of social
conflict over sexual space. This process is never complete, but rather dependent upon
women’s capacity to question, organise, and defend their rights through struggle.
Nationalism, gender and the PNA influence each other as relatively autonomous, but often
conflicting, systems of value and normative action.
These features of statebuilding figure in discussions about gender in the Middle East in
general, and in Palestinian society in particular. The Palestinian National Authority has
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become a legal entity since 1993, resembling a state, although lacking the requisite tools
with which to govern effectively. What does this mean for Palestinian women? To
acknowledge the centrality of the PNA as an actor in Palestinian society, means also to
recognize its incapacity to live up to societal expectations. The roots of its weakness stem
from various elements of its development. The informal impetus for Palestinian national self
determination came about in response to over a century of popular struggle against
occupation by foreign powers, and culminating in the Intifada. The actual establishment of
the Palestinian National Authority and prospects for statehood however, were mediated
through a slew of diplomatic agreements with external actors.55 Therefore, the statebuilding
process has been regulated and controlled through stages of negotiation between
representatives at the national level whose power is grossly asymmetrical. This process
has also developed with limited input from the popular arena. At this stage then, the
process of Palestinian statebuilding has created a distorted political context in which
sovereignty is absent, but there is significant investment in legislative activity as the
Legislative Council presently embarks upon first time legislation. 
The PNA’s capacity to legislate is constrained by a variety of mutually reinforcing factors.
For example, the PNA  is limited in resources, fraught with clientalism, highly militarized
(police forces), and submerged within a sophisticated civil society manifested by alternative
power centres which developed out of years of protracted warfare and occupation. The
PNA lacks the elements of contract, monopoly, authority, and sovereignty which
traditionally define a state. As such, the PNA is said to operate with relative powerlessness
under official protections of the international community and international law. Through
negotiations over terms for the transfer of power, the PNA has acquired jurisdiction over
education, taxation, tourism, health and social welfare, but not in the crucial areas of law,
water, land, and refugees, which are to be worked out in the Final Status Negotiations with
Israel in the near, but indefinite, future.56 The PNA’s bureaucratic weaknesses are
contingent upon certain internal structures, for example, the absence of a Basic Law and
an ambiguous separation between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches.57 This
situation inhibits the check and balance of arbitrary and corrupt elements against
administrative privilege. There is evidence of excessive reliance upon the monopoly over
means of coercion as a source of social control, for example, in the arrest and interrogation
of journalists, political activists, teachers and arguably, anyone expressing dissent. In the
absence of legitimate authority, current agreements bolster the security functions of the
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strong Palestinian police force as a foundation of political power.58 As well, the PNA’s
tendency to rule through patronage and factionalism reflects its dependence upon long-
standing networks of traditional clan and family authority.59 This leaves the PNA with a
problematic set of resources with which to implement its policies and provide social
protection. There is widespread complaint about the limited possibilities for citizen’s input
in public policy making,60 as well as uncertainty about what constitutes citizenship in the
transitional period. Finally, the PNA is itself highly unrepresentative of women, starting out
in 1994 with one woman, Intisar Al-Wazir, Minister of Social Affairs, out of a total of
nineteen ministers. Presently, there are two women ministers, Al-Wazir and Hannan
Ashrawi, Minister of Higher Education, out of a total of twenty-four ministers. As to the
elections for the Presidency and the Legislative Council held on January 21, 1996, the
number of women candidates reached twenty-eight, a mere 4% of the total number of
candidates. Out of eighty-eight of the Legislative Council seats, only five were won by
women. An analysis of the PNA as a gendered institution takes into account the ways in
which it formulates political boundaries on the basis of sexual difference. A crucial
boundary studied by feminists is the public/private divide. J. Ann Tickner considers this
division as an underlying component of relations of domination based on gender. She
conceptualizes,
the boundary between a public domestic space protected, at least
theoretically, by the rule of law and the private space of the family where, in
many cases, no such legal protection exists.61 
These boundaries mold, not only relations of domination and access to power, but also
realms of appropriate and socially valued activity in areas ranging from governance, to
labour, to social welfare. The legal boundaries which constitute what is considered to be
“public” and “private” in Palestinian society are embodied in the notion of citizenship and
legal rights.
Citizenship:
I have presented four aspects of Palestinian nationalism which impinge upon the
formulation of citizenship: (1) the central, yet contradictory, role of women in the Intifada,
(2) patriarchal discourses underlying the Palestinian national liberation movement, (3) the
rise of political Islam, and (4) structural limitations of the PNA as a framework for legal
struggle. These issues and relationships serve to articulate the terms in which women
negotiate their position in statebuilding and influence the construction of citizenship.
Citizenship is generally defined as a contractual agreement between the state and its
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populace as a basis for following a predictable and agreed upon arrangement of rights and
obligations. It is perceived as a normative relationship between the individual (native or
naturalized person) and political authority, regulated by an exchange of allegiance in return
for membership and protections. Rights and obligations are institutionalized through the
juridical sphere as a result of conflict over the boundaries of political, economic, social,
cultural, religious and familial space. What are the meanings and implications of
discussions about citizenship in the case of the PNA, considering its lack of attributes of
statehood and its general context of instability?
With the transfer of authority, significant debate is taking shape within the Palestinian
women’s movement regarding the gendered nature of rights in areas of labour, religion,
personal status and public representation. I would urge that gender-sensitive perspectives
on citizenship approach the issue of rights and obligations in both the public and private
spheres. Because women are largely underrepresented in public arenas of power, such as
in government and wage-labour markets, their recourse to legal action must extend beyond
the public sphere. Women’s needs are related to broader issues of personal status and
labour law, and social welfare entitlements. The PNA plays a central role in empowering
or disempowering the different contenders for political power over these issues through its
formulation of membership in the community. Women expect to be compensated by law
for their contribution to national liberation in the form of equal rights and obligations, but
they want their citizenship to conform to their traditional needs in mothering and social
welfare. Despite its lack of sovereignty, the PNA has become a central address for
grievances about social protections. Considering the underlying gendered dynamics of
nationalism, the PNA can be seen as both a potential threat as well as a potential haven
for women.
Eileen Kuttab from the Women’s Studies Program at Birzeit University, and long-time
activist in the Palestinian women’s and cooperative movement, argues that the
subordination of a social agenda to that of the national program in the women’s movement
problematized women’s ability to combine their increased activism with more input in
decision-making at the national level.62 As the focus of national struggle presently shifts
from the grassroots level (family and street) to the level of international diplomacy, women
are wary of further marginalization.63 The issue is not only women’s lack of power in relation
to stronger, malestream forces in the PNA, but the fact that women’s struggles take place
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within structures which are themselves weak and precarious. One may ask whether the
PNA is indeed the proper strategic address for women’s struggles considering that civil
society has traditionally offered the women’s movement a certain extra-judicial freedom of
maneuver. Or does the need for political resources and legal protections override the
benefits of independence? Also, if the legislative arena is itself weakened by its
inseparation from the executive power, to what extent is legal reform a potentially
successful form of activism? These questions are met with divergent responses in the
women’s movement.
A concern about neo-colonialism has been voiced strongly by women opposed to the Oslo
agreement who would not as yet abandon revolutionary agendas, and who are cautious
about participation in legislative activity in the PNA. Despite the official terminology of
“peace negotiations”, they point to the continued asymmetrical influence by Israel, the
United States and other external actors over the internal Palestinian political process.64 The
PNA’s lack of sovereignty, they claim, creates a problematic context for women’s agency
in a continued conflictual climate. In the area of legal reform, one of the main strategic
questions facing the women’s movement is whether to continue with sectarian politics or
to form a united women’s platform.65 On this issue, Rita Giacaman has argued that the
weakness of the women’s movement stems from continued disunity.66 There are problems
of competition, lack of independent representation, and marginalization within malestream
political parties and national institutions.67 In Giacaman’s opinion, organised women from
all sectors need to unite with independent women - academics and professionals, in order
to forge a common agenda. On the other hand, one may argue it is the very diversity in the
women’s movement that allows for vibrant discussion about citizenship. These are some
of the important questions being asked about gender, statebuilding and Palestinian
citizenship.
Lobbying around legislation and citizenship has required that women’s groups build a close,
yet critical, working relationship with the Palestinian Legislative Council. Lobbying efforts
and campaigns to scrutinize the legislative process while establishing means to empower
women through the law have been led mostly by non-governmental or quasi-governmental
organisations.68 Contemporary discussions about the relationship between women and the
PNA are informed by the Document of Principles of Women’s Rights, written under the
auspices of the General Union of Palestinian Women, and representing all four streams of
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the women’s movement, plus independent activists. The document distinguishes between
three elements of citizenship (1) civil rights, (2) political rights, and (3) social, economic and
cultural rights, each of which I will analyse in turn.
Civil rights relate to the most basic formulation of terms upon which individuals attain
membership in the national community, and through which members are afforded rights
and obligations. As in most European continental countries and all Arab countries,
Palestinians acquire citizenship through the principle of jus sanguine (Law of Blood/Right
of the Blood), by which a child obtains the citizenship of his/her parents.69 The more
particular requirement of citizenship however, is that a child must be born of a father who
has Palestinian citizenship provided that the father resides in the Palestinian territories and
holds an Israeli identification card.70 Therefore, despite the discursive construction of
women as reproducers of the nation, Palestinian citizenship is passed on through paternity
rather than maternity, either from father to child or from husband to wife. Women cannot
pass their citizenship to their husband or children. This is not only an issue of political
exclusion, but also a practical dilemma for women living in the diaspora who have married
non-Palestinians but want to share their national identity with their offspring.71 Palestinian
women lose their citizenship upon marriage of a “foreigner”. In the Document, the section
on civil rights makes the following demands:
To grant the woman her right to acquire, preserve or change her nationality.
Legislation must also guarantee that her marriage to a non-Palestinian, or a
change in her husband’s nationality, while married, will not necessarily
change the citizenship of the wife. This includes her freedom from the
imposition of her husband’s citizenship. Women should also be granted the
right to give citizenship to her husband and children, be guaranteed the full
freedom to move, travel, and choose her place of residency.72
Despite the inability to remove women’s dependent terms of citizenship, women’s groups
were successful in pressing for freedom of mobility, making obsolete the requirement that
women have permission of a male guardian in order to obtain a Palestinian travel
document.73
Political citizenship represents issues such as equal rights to vote and acquire
representation in public life as affirmed in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence of
November, 1988. 
Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-
discrimination in public rights on grounds of race, religion, color, sex, under
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the aegis of a constitution that ensures the rule of law and an independent
judiciary.74
In the area of political rights, the Document suggests the following aims:
To guarantee the right of women in voting, running for office, involvement in
public referendums, and the ability to hold political and public judicial posts
on all levels.75
Campaigns for women’s political rights revolved around preparation for the 1996 elections
to the Presidency and Legislative Council. Women’s groups lobbied for a women’s quota
of 30% in the Legislative Council, (which was ignored by the leadership). Secondly, they
have protested the multi-district electoral system which by providing limited seats in some
districts, they claim, discriminates against women. As well, they have pointed to
contraventions and breaches in the electoral process against the rights of women, for
example, the right to vote of a large number of illiterate women was confiscated by relatives
who voted on their behalf or dictated to them how to vote.76 Numerous non-governmental
organisations offered training programs for women leaders and courses on voting and
elections in order to increase women’s awareness of their political rights. Obviously, the
formal rights enshrined in the Declaration of Independence do not necessarily provide for
women’s equality in political practice since actual political equality stems from underlying
processes of social and economic equalities encompassed in the area of social citizenship.
Social citizenship pertains to more complex questions of social security (such as old age
benefits, public housing, maternity, unemployment insurance and welfare) as embodied in
a welfare state (a model that is globally on the wane).77 One of the most contemporary
debates about women’s rights and the state in the Middle East however, revolves around
the issue of whether social citizenship will be formulated around individual or communal
entitlements. Suad Joseph has argued that Middle Eastern states tend to acknowledge the
citizen as a member of family units, religious sects, ethnic, tribal or other subnational
groupings.78 In turn, these groups mediate access to scarce resources and social support
through the state on behalf of their members. As a result of the privileging of the patriarchal
family as the basic unit of social life in the Middle East, women are recognized as citizens
only through their family ties with men. They are brought into the nation/state as
appendages of husbands and fathers and tend to be depicted in their familial roles as wives
and mothers.79 In a communally-based notion of citizenship, women’s legal entitlements
and relationship to the state are predicated upon fulfillment of their reproductive roles in the
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family. Here we recognize that discursively constructed gendered nationalism becomes
legalized through processes of statehood.
Rita Giacaman, Islah Jad and Penny Johnson discuss issues of social citizenship in
Palestinian society through their analysis of the PLO’s General Program for National
Economic Development. They argue that existing social support in Palestinian autonomy
areas functions predominantly outside the realm of national institutions such as in familial,
kinship and other informal networks, non-governmental organisations and political parties.80
They recognize the positive, albeit problematic, relationship between women and their
networks of support. Giacaman and her colleagues demonstrate that when women are
referred to in the Document, (as in the chapter on Women in Special Circumstances), they
are reduced to the category of “destitute”, requiring assistance, or in relation to “workers”,
“martyrs”, and “prisoners” assumed always to be in the masculine.81 Provision of social
service to women is formulated as an issue of charity and maintenance, to be taken care
of by charitable societies, women’s groups or the household, the latter of which is assumed
to be led by a male member, disregarding female heads of household who are either
divorced, abandoned or who choose to be single.82 The Report on the Status of Palestinian
Women presented at the 39th Session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of
Women affirms that the number of female-headed households in the West Bank is as high
as 36.6% and 17.9% in Gaza.83
A second, albeit related, discussion about social citizenship revolves around whether social
welfare will be constructed on the basis of demonstrable and abject need, universal rights
of citizenship, or market oriented entitlements based on work performance.84 This question
cuts to the root of the reproduction versus production debate in feminist theory and
questions what constitutes valuable labour in Palestinian society. In the section on
economic, social and cultural rights, the Document focuses on women’s rights in the wage-
labour force,
The Constitution and Palestinian legislation must guarantee the equality of
women at work, ensuring equal pay with men working in the same work,
providing equal opportunities in promotion, training, compensation, rewards,
health insurance and maternity rights....We also affirm the importance of
equality in social welfare, health benefits, education, and training services,
and the guarantee of her full equality regarding issues pertaining to personal
status.85
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However, Palestinian women’s groups are concerned about the predominant linking of
rights and social services to remunerated labour. The dilemma for women is that their
under-representation in the wage-labour force potentially undermines their access to social
security in a model of citizenship based on performance in the market. Women’s groups
are interested, not only in women’s equal rights in the wage-labour force, but also in
articulating social rights as a means of de-commodifying individuals in relation to the
market. With reference to western welfare states, G. Esping Anderson explains the term,
De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right,
and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.86
Rita Giacaman et al, argue that the PLO’s economic agenda is based on a program of
relatively short term economic development through stimulating private investment and
creating temporary, and primarily unskilled, labour markets. This strategy tends to intensify
divisions in society between employed and unemployed, and between skilled and unskilled
labour, both of which are highly gendered since women are predominantly unemployed,
unskilled and working in the informal economy. Women’s groups have argued that the
emphasis on paid labour and market productivity discriminates against women, whose non-
market contributions to society, in terms of broad and complex processes of reproduction,
nurturance and socialization in the household and extended family, are undervalued.87 To
rectify this situation, the Document demands that,
Motherhood should be looked upon as a social post. House chores should
be regarded as a task of social and economic value.88
This demand is problematic considering that while it reflects women’s traditional needs, it
also potentially restricts women’s struggles within areas subsumed by motherhood.
Through a series of workshops held in Ramallah in 1994 through the auspices of the
Jerusalem Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, women’s groups discussed the nature of
labour in Palestinian society.89 Under Article 15(1) of the Labour Law, a labour contract is
recognized as
any oral or written agreement whether explicit or implicit by which the worker
undertakes to work for an employer and under his supervision and direction
in return for a wage.90
Three elements of work were recognized as necessary for the signing of a labour contract:
(1) work, (2) supervision, and (3) payment. They concluded that these conditions deny legal
protection for the weaker members of society, particularly women, who engage in domestic
service, employment in small or family-run industries, or agricultural projects.91 Women are
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predominantly involved therefore, in unorganised and unprotected labour. This has
ramifications for their ability to acquire independent income and rally the government as a
strong and organised pressure group.
The last, and perhaps most contentious, issue pertaining to women and social citizenship
is the area of personal status law governing marriage, divorce, inheritance and child
custody. Personal status law is an influential and controversial arena of legal power as it
shapes the contours of the Palestinian community towards the outside, and directly
impinges upon relationships within the family, where women are at times most vulnerable.
Along with increasing attention to the issue of domestic violence, the Palestinian women’s
movement has directed its efforts towards debating reform of personal status law. It is
interesting to note that secular laws apply in all legal matters pertaining to contract, criminal
law, civil wrongs, and commercial law92, except in the area of personal status which is
governed by the Sharia (Islamic canon law). Sharia law is the legal area where religion and
statebuilding is most closely intertwined.93 Personal status law is formulated through a
literal interpretation of sacred texts which are themselves highly ambiguous. This has
created problems since the selective nature of Islamic legal code provides room for
manipulation against women, particularly since those authorized to interpret the Quran (a
basis of Sharia) are mostly male. The predominance of male judges sitting on Sharia courts
raises the question about women’s equal rights in domestic litigation since interpretation
is based on the experiences and perspectives of men. The enduring penetration of religion
in the state in the area of personal status law has both positive and negative consequences
for women. Sharia provides women with the right to inheritance, equal rights in contract,
rights to enterprise, maintenance, and to earn and possess property independently of
men.94 However, through the Sharia, women are secured through dependence upon men.
Passages in the Quran such as those providing for polygamy, for women’s inferiority and
obedience to the husband, for women’s seclusion, and a lower non-alterable percentage
of transferable property granted to women, can be used to deny women equal rights.
Women’s organisations are presently debating strategies to address discrimination against
women in personal status law. They seem to be divided between those who support the
dictates of the Sharia, those who attempt to reinterpret the Sharia in favour of indigenous
forms of gender-activism, and secular feminists who see women’s emancipation and
Islamic law as contradictory, and thus wish to extricate religion from state law altogether.95
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Some have argued for a more “progressive” interpretation of Sharia since all women’s
rights are considered to be contained in Islam.96 The latter strategy could be strengthened
with additional tools such as the marriage contract which would solidify women’s rights in
the Sharia through secular contract.97 Others have argued for replacing Sharia altogether
with a civil code. The latter has proven to be a highly unpopular strategy considering the
deep roots of Islam in Palestinian popular culture and nationalism. The leadership
continues to respond favourably to legal reforms so long as they do not “contradict the
Sharia”, thus closing off the realm of debate from the beginning. Changes to Sharia laws
will depend to a large extent on the type of resistance put forth by political Islam, as well
as on long-term efforts to re-articulate the cultural norms of honour and shame which
stigmatize women who air their private problems in public venues.98 It will also depend upon
continuing relationships forged through the Israeli-Palestinian political process. A more
stable and satisfactory peace agreement may one day provide space for a more critical
internal assessment of Palestinian society by women and other progressive forces intent
upon change.
Concluding Remarks:
I will make two concluding remarks about the nature of women’s activism in reference to
both the Document of Principles of Women’s Rights, and to the relationship between the
women’s movement and the PNA. The Document is concerned with the notion of pursuing
a common agenda for women across factional lines, thus articulating women’s concerns
separately from nationalist concerns. It offers an extensive articulation of the need for
women’s equality in all matters pertaining to citizenship and legal rights in the public and
private spheres, reflecting the unique approach of the Palestinian women’s movement to
citizenship in contrast to western models. There is significant reference in the Document
to the woman’s “...vital role in the preservation of the unity of the Palestinian family as a
social base to support individuals in the absence of a Palestinian national authority”.99 In
addition to the demand for equality in work, pay and benefits, the Document’s demand for
recognition of motherhood as a social chore, strays from the model of liberal feminism
which tends to devalue differences between men and women in their struggles in the public
sphere. By contrast, gender differences are regarded as structural in both the public and
private spheres. Therefore, citizenship is formulated in an attempt to accommodate both
the changing nature of gender relations in work, politics and public representation, as well
as traditional elements of Palestinian society and culture based on the centrality of the
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family. However, consideration of the changes in Palestinian society must take into account
the changing nature of the family unit as well. This emphasis on family unity may be
problematic for example, for those individuals deprived of access to a patriarchal family.
A second issue is the extensive focus of the women’s movement on transformation through
legal reform. This is a crucial area of struggle as the PNA embarks upon constructing new
laws which will impact future possibilities for gender activism. Discussions about gender
and citizenship have reflected a growing realization that because woman’s liberation in
Palestinian society is distinct from national liberation, women must unite as a group to
pressure for legal reform. However, there are always potential discrepancies between legal
rights and the actual implementation of those rights. The legal sphere is limited in the face
of broader processes of patriarchal domination. An example is in cases where the judiciary,
occupied by a predominant number of male judges, might interpret laws in ways
unaccommodating to women. This discrepancy between practical, as opposed to legal,
rights arises as well in cases where women refrain from claiming their inheritance in favour
of upholding their familial right to maintenance through dependence upon a husband or
brother. Indeed, women’s abandonment of claims to inheritance as provided for by law, or
cases of disinheritance through manipulation of wills, can result from cultural or social
customs, protection of lineage property, or familial expectations, rather than legal
discrimination.100 Therefore, projects for legal reform must consider not only the
pervasiveness of cultural and traditional norms, but also, ways in which these processes
are reconstructed and manipulated for purposes of political interest. 
Finally, the power of the PNA in implementing legal verdicts and ensuring compliance is
tempered by continued lack of authority and a general context of instability. Successful
legal reform will be affected by the absence of an independent judiciary and judicial review.
This is both an issue of internal weakness and continued external control. Empowerment
through the law will remain therefore, an important, yet problematic, arena for gender
activism. The transition from nationalism to interim self-government has erected
contradictory boundaries around women’s struggles. Whether or not women will succeed
in securing their rights will depend upon elements of democracy and citizenship in the
evolution of statebuilding and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the nature of Palestinian civil
society, the struggle between contenders for political authority, and the influence of the
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organised women’s movement over the decision making process in public, private and
foreign policy.
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